

#### The GNU Name System

Bernd Fix, Christian Grothoff, Martin Schanzenbach 2023-09-27

# Directories / DNS



#### The .alt TLD

Whats wrong with DNS? See RFC 8324<sup>1</sup>:

- No query privacy.
- A single hierarchy with a centrally controlled root.
- Requires management/maintenance of **root servers**.
- etc...

DNSSEC and other "patches" do not or in adequately address the issues: "[the existing solutions for DNS are] security patches rather than designed-in security or privacy mechanisms".

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>DNS Privacy, Authorization, Special Uses, Encoding, Characters, Matching, and Root Structure: Time for Another Look?

# Directories / GNS



#### The .alt TLD

## Why ".gns.alt"?

- RFC9476: "The .alt Special-Use Top-Level Domain" defines the TLD to be used for alternative (from the point of view of DNS) name systems.
- RFC9476 does **not** define a registry for ".alt"-subdomains.
- We manage a ".alt" registry at https://gana.gnunet.org <sup>2</sup> which already includes a code point for ".gns.alt".
- To prevent shadowing of DNS names, it is recommended to use the ".gns.alt" suffix.
- Sometimes (e.g. censorship-overrides) you may not want to do that.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>If you ever need a registry for your protocol feel free to approach us!

## The GNU Name System

- Namespaces are created and uniquely identified using public zone keys.
- Records are grouped by label, encrypted, signed, and published in a key-value store (usually, a DHT<sup>3</sup>).
- Supported zone types and crypto (for now):
  - PKEY: ECDSA+CTR-AES-256
  - EDKEY: EdDSA+XSalsa20-Poly1305





Public Zone Key

Label

#### Resource Records


A: 1.2.3.4

TXT: Hello World


MX: mail.example.org

<sup>3</sup>https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-schanzen-r5n/


# **Zone management**




## Name resolution



## Name resolution



# How do we bootstrap the top-level zones?



#### The Start Zone

"Hyper-hyper local root" concept we call the **Start Zone**:

- Start Zone contains so-called **suffix-to-zone**-mappings.
- Implementation ships with an *initial* Start Zone configuration.
- Start Zone is configurable *locally* at *each* endpoint.
- User override/extension of mappings at top-level or subdomain-level for:
  - Circumvent censorship if necessary.
  - Private networks.

#### The Start Zone

# Some TLDs

### Example suffix-to-zone mappings:

- .com = 000G001MF6DVMZZ4Y8XRZQDXM1PB3D3VGEK29ZHXBA57EPSNW1QBPKT8J0 .myzone.gns.alt = 000G007FKSA876G6SNDF8VA7YK1DJE96RPPBHRT2X55Q13M2T4YKNYT3DG # Some subdomain overrides .gnu.org = 000G001223Q8ZJZBSK6XT2DWV6PE5B1W436D2NB7ZBR9XSXT7TFJHCDB24
- .gnunet.gns.alt = 000G0047M3HN599H57MPXZK4VB59SWK4M9NRD68E1JQFY3RWAHDMKAPN30

### **Possible Governance Models**


- Non-profit organization.
- Multi-stakeholder model: Board, supporting organizations, ...
- Examples for possible stakeholders:
  - Software and OS Distributors
  - Browser vendors
  - Governments
- Funding options:
  - Applications for new top-level domains.
  - Registrations of new top-level domains.
  - ...


# Hiding information inside GNS

- GNS's crypto allows you to hide resource records.
- It requires either
  - the use of a label with sufficient entropy (a shared secret) or
  - the use of a secret zone.




## **Encrypt**







#### **Derive**




## Combine and publish




# Query




## Retrieve




# Verify



# Decrypt



## **Decrypt**



#### **Status**

- Specification efforts:
  - https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-schanzen-gns/ Will become RFC soon (TM).
  - https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-schanzen-r5n/ Is being worked on.
- Reference implementation in C (part of GNUnet), alternative implementation in Go.
- Currently funded project to develop and host a GNS zone registrar service and to mirror some (large) DNS zones funded through NLnet / NGI Zero Entrust.
- Current and future research:
  - PQ-secure key blinding.
  - Sharing identity information via GNS (re:claimID).

### Questions?

https://gnunet.org

schanzen@gnu.org 3D11 063C 10F9 8D14 BD24 D147 0B09 98EF 86F5 9B6A